Opening of part three comments
So--let's get the party started
posted by Tom at 5:53 PM
11 comments
Sunday, February 24, 2008
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Fighting Words
janet w has left a new comment on your post "Psyop":
Them's Fightin' Words!
When I read John McCain's oft-repeated line, that the transcendent challenge of the 21st century is radical Islamic extremists" I hardly know where to start parsing the sentence. Words do matter and saying "transcendent", "challenge", "Islamic" inflames the situation, imo, and leads not to solutions but to the intensifying of positions and that is not helpful.
How can we dial back or tone down the exaggerated rhetoric of a campaign year?
Them's Fightin' Words!
When I read John McCain's oft-repeated line, that the transcendent challenge of the 21st century is radical Islamic extremists" I hardly know where to start parsing the sentence. Words do matter and saying "transcendent", "challenge", "Islamic" inflames the situation, imo, and leads not to solutions but to the intensifying of positions and that is not helpful.
How can we dial back or tone down the exaggerated rhetoric of a campaign year?
posted by Tom at 6:52 PM
1 comments
Avoiding decline
Laura has left a new comment on your post "Psyop":
Section 3 is my favorite so far even though I am only a short way through it. I totally agree with Tom that for a nation to succeed it "will not avoid risk; it will avoid decline." When I think of the word "decline" I immediately think "and fall". The decline and fall of the Roman Empire as an example. How can we fight decline? Toms says "We cannot allow ourselves to be put into situations where we cannot utilize our inherent advantages." But we cannot rely on one sole strength such as military power or borders or technology. We must diversify our strengths. I believe we must look at decline in the long term. The economy ebbs and flows and we mustn't panic right away. History proves Tom's statement that "there appears to be a constant churn that allows a country or a power to rise to preeminence and then sucks it back down in a few decades or centuries." The US has a special consideration as a super power. We have responsibility and Tom says "Part of that responsibility is to act with extreme caution and malice of forethought to maintain a stable world environment." I interpret this to mean that the US cannot and should not stand alone as we make decisions. We have to realize that every action we make affects the entire world to some degree. That does not mean we should put the world first. We must find ways to measure our strengths and successes in a long term view and to stave off decline. We must change with the world situation and adjust to new political situations and technology. But we must do this while keeping before us that "the United States was created for freedom, not safety." and it is based on a "government of law." What do you think we can do to ensure that the US remains a strong super power rather than being relegated to the history books like the Roman Empire?
Section 3 is my favorite so far even though I am only a short way through it. I totally agree with Tom that for a nation to succeed it "will not avoid risk; it will avoid decline." When I think of the word "decline" I immediately think "and fall". The decline and fall of the Roman Empire as an example. How can we fight decline? Toms says "We cannot allow ourselves to be put into situations where we cannot utilize our inherent advantages." But we cannot rely on one sole strength such as military power or borders or technology. We must diversify our strengths. I believe we must look at decline in the long term. The economy ebbs and flows and we mustn't panic right away. History proves Tom's statement that "there appears to be a constant churn that allows a country or a power to rise to preeminence and then sucks it back down in a few decades or centuries." The US has a special consideration as a super power. We have responsibility and Tom says "Part of that responsibility is to act with extreme caution and malice of forethought to maintain a stable world environment." I interpret this to mean that the US cannot and should not stand alone as we make decisions. We have to realize that every action we make affects the entire world to some degree. That does not mean we should put the world first. We must find ways to measure our strengths and successes in a long term view and to stave off decline. We must change with the world situation and adjust to new political situations and technology. But we must do this while keeping before us that "the United States was created for freedom, not safety." and it is based on a "government of law." What do you think we can do to ensure that the US remains a strong super power rather than being relegated to the history books like the Roman Empire?
posted by Tom at 6:51 PM
2 comments
some questions I promise to get to
Beginning on pg 21 I have serious questions. Tom says "to question the government could be construed to be aiding and abetting the enemy." I heartily disagree. Most glaringly obvious is that Tom has published this book and yet remains free to move about the country and work with dangerous materials. All of us are discussing this book and I know I have yet to have a knock at the door or anyone questioning my loyalty to the US. Turn on the tv, open a newspaper, check out a bookstore. The media seemingly does nothing but bash our nation's leaders past, present and future. If we truly were targeted as aiding and abetting the enemy every time we questioned the government, then all of us and those in the media would be in a dank cell somewhere.
On pg 23, Tom addresses security saying that the US "was adequately physically secure." Who defines "adequately secure"? What is acceptable in criminal activity? How do you quantify this? a certain number of crimes...percentage of violent crimes?
This leads me to ask who determines the "real truths (risks, threats, strengths, weaknesses, etc.)" that Tom says are necessary to create a strategic plan? I'm not trying to be argumentative; rather trying to understand how it will be possible to create a viable strategic plan.
On pg 25, Tom says we have "allowed 19 zealots to change the course of America." What role does the opinion of other nations play in our response? Does world opinion or should world opinion influence our response? I don't think that 19 zealots were the only thing that influenced our response. Certainly if those had been acting alone, I could agree. But these men were part of a greater network. That network was then aided and abetted by other countries. To me this exposed those who would help anyone who wanted to hurt the US and its citizens.
On fear, pg 26 "We want fear inculcated throughout our society so that we can justify aggression, single mindedness, an inability to take advice from long time friends, a willingness to give up the liberties that others died for." Who is we? Do you mean the American people? Why on earth would this be our wish? I can certainly understand the need you explained to elevate our foe to a worthy opponent, but this does not resonate with me. I do not want to live in fear, justify aggression, cause political enmity with our allies or give up my liberties. I am exercising them right now to disagree with Tom and to even discuss this. What American do you know who would agree with this?
As we speak about the terrorists I am finding that the views seem contradictory. If the terrorists are short-sighted and their goal was not just to kill but to instill fear causing us to restructure our society, then isn't that a long term goal? They have played beautifully into Tom's definition of asymmetry. OTOH if we refuse to react and spit in their faces, are we taunting them to attack us harder? I don't know if it is so, but I see us as kids on a playground saying "Is that all you've got? You don't hurt me." What reaction can we give that doesn't further antagonize them? Also since Tom has said that someone has thought of the risks beforehand of scenarios, hasn't the government already (albeit tacitly) said this was an acceptable risk? Going back to the terrorists as short-term thinkers, if the threat is short term then shouldn't our response be also? Tom says our response is a short term one.
One last question, how do you fund courage? Tom speaks repeatedly of education and funding and rights. Tom, how would you or how would anyone reading this suggest a plan to promote and fund courage?
2-18-08
On pg 23, Tom addresses security saying that the US "was adequately physically secure." Who defines "adequately secure"? What is acceptable in criminal activity? How do you quantify this? a certain number of crimes...percentage of violent crimes?
This leads me to ask who determines the "real truths (risks, threats, strengths, weaknesses, etc.)" that Tom says are necessary to create a strategic plan? I'm not trying to be argumentative; rather trying to understand how it will be possible to create a viable strategic plan.
On pg 25, Tom says we have "allowed 19 zealots to change the course of America." What role does the opinion of other nations play in our response? Does world opinion or should world opinion influence our response? I don't think that 19 zealots were the only thing that influenced our response. Certainly if those had been acting alone, I could agree. But these men were part of a greater network. That network was then aided and abetted by other countries. To me this exposed those who would help anyone who wanted to hurt the US and its citizens.
On fear, pg 26 "We want fear inculcated throughout our society so that we can justify aggression, single mindedness, an inability to take advice from long time friends, a willingness to give up the liberties that others died for." Who is we? Do you mean the American people? Why on earth would this be our wish? I can certainly understand the need you explained to elevate our foe to a worthy opponent, but this does not resonate with me. I do not want to live in fear, justify aggression, cause political enmity with our allies or give up my liberties. I am exercising them right now to disagree with Tom and to even discuss this. What American do you know who would agree with this?
As we speak about the terrorists I am finding that the views seem contradictory. If the terrorists are short-sighted and their goal was not just to kill but to instill fear causing us to restructure our society, then isn't that a long term goal? They have played beautifully into Tom's definition of asymmetry. OTOH if we refuse to react and spit in their faces, are we taunting them to attack us harder? I don't know if it is so, but I see us as kids on a playground saying "Is that all you've got? You don't hurt me." What reaction can we give that doesn't further antagonize them? Also since Tom has said that someone has thought of the risks beforehand of scenarios, hasn't the government already (albeit tacitly) said this was an acceptable risk? Going back to the terrorists as short-term thinkers, if the threat is short term then shouldn't our response be also? Tom says our response is a short term one.
One last question, how do you fund courage? Tom speaks repeatedly of education and funding and rights. Tom, how would you or how would anyone reading this suggest a plan to promote and fund courage?
2-18-08
posted by Tom at 6:50 PM
1 comments
Great Discussion on PSYOP--as always
...and sorry for my absence in it. A few things-
In the conversation about Information Warfare--Information Warfare is largely defensive, it is the protecting of your information while trying to exploit the information systems of the enemy. Like all warfare areas, there is an inherent overlap with other warfare areas. So the information warfare folks would be involved in finding weak spots or critical nodes in an enemy's information systems, they likily would not make the decision on what to do with them--though they do maintain an ability to hack into systems. I do not consider psyop as a subset--two critical things that always have to be remembered about psyop---there is no kinetic act--so, keeping in mind that warfare areas overlap, the psyop people will use a kinetic attack to broaden the effect of the attack--perhaps by broadcasting it in advance---one of the interesting things about the leaflets drops conducted leading up to Iraq---the Iraqis were not influenced by the messages but were interested in the military's ability to hit them with paper. the other thing to remember is that psyop is about influencing thought---the case has been made all warfare is psyop--as in order to win you have to make the enemy willing to quit--so dropping the second atom bomb was about convincing Japan to quit--but does not really fit a psyop---Doolittles raid, on the other had, influence thought and strategic planning--and I think fits a psyop profile.
with regard to sleeper cells, I think that the promotion of that possibility by radicals is a huge psyop----because we lack the baseline assessment of what risk we are willing to accept, no FBI DHS person is able to talk the threat down or disavow it--because it is in the realm of possibility.
on to the next section!! (let me know any specific questions remaining)
In the conversation about Information Warfare--Information Warfare is largely defensive, it is the protecting of your information while trying to exploit the information systems of the enemy. Like all warfare areas, there is an inherent overlap with other warfare areas. So the information warfare folks would be involved in finding weak spots or critical nodes in an enemy's information systems, they likily would not make the decision on what to do with them--though they do maintain an ability to hack into systems. I do not consider psyop as a subset--two critical things that always have to be remembered about psyop---there is no kinetic act--so, keeping in mind that warfare areas overlap, the psyop people will use a kinetic attack to broaden the effect of the attack--perhaps by broadcasting it in advance---one of the interesting things about the leaflets drops conducted leading up to Iraq---the Iraqis were not influenced by the messages but were interested in the military's ability to hit them with paper. the other thing to remember is that psyop is about influencing thought---the case has been made all warfare is psyop--as in order to win you have to make the enemy willing to quit--so dropping the second atom bomb was about convincing Japan to quit--but does not really fit a psyop---Doolittles raid, on the other had, influence thought and strategic planning--and I think fits a psyop profile.
with regard to sleeper cells, I think that the promotion of that possibility by radicals is a huge psyop----because we lack the baseline assessment of what risk we are willing to accept, no FBI DHS person is able to talk the threat down or disavow it--because it is in the realm of possibility.
on to the next section!! (let me know any specific questions remaining)
posted by Tom at 6:11 PM
0 comments
