That is the problem with a three four year old manuscript

Some things have changed! From LG:

"Also, you say that Al Qaeda is defunct and that it committed suicide. As someone who was in London the day before the July 7th attacks and has recently watched the coverage of the attempted attack in Glasgow, it feels like there is some life in them yet.

Finally, do you feel that the issues discussed in your manuscript are applicable to other countries or do they relate only to the US as a superpower?"

After the fall of Berlin, Nazis continued to fight for several years, and, people who believed in the vision of the Third Reich actively pursued that vision. Similarly people who were part of Al Qaeda or who believe in the vision of Al Qaeda will continue to "soldier on". So when the manuscript was first written, the statement was accurate. Unfortunately what is now occurring is that 1) the ongoing conflict in Iraq is feeding the radical fundamentalist base 2) The failure to close the deal in Afghanistan has allowed a resurgence of Al Qaeda and Taliban 3) The cause is taking on a "Think globally, act locally" sort of philosophy. They are realizing that they do not need central command and control to carry out acts. (That will hurt their efforts in the long run).

I think the views apply universally--but it becomes more and more imperative with strength, as it is that very strength that can be turned against you.

A sign of strength?

From JW: "In colloquial terms, everytime we're attacked, we make money. Even writing that seems too harsh a statement but it's true. Maybe because we don't like to think of ourselves as profiting from the misery of others?

Is that a sign of our strength? That kind of equivocation?"

This is not so much a sign of strength as it is a sign of resilience. But the specific point is that there is a different vantage point when viewing the effect of terrorists attacks that are valid and important. As Allen Green span pointed out, GDP increased after Hurricane Katrina as a result of money being pulled from the investments of insurance companies and put back into circulation. The same economics apply to 9-11, albeit on a much smaller scale. So again, at the macro level, this is not a judgment on our societal mores, but rather, a statement of fact that terrorism benefits an economic sector of our industrial complex. Now, following the assertion that terrorism is primarily a psychological operation, which message would we prefer the terrorist receive--that they make us afraid or that they help us increase our GDP?

Paradox

In "Combating Terrorism" I discuss terrorism as a paradox---that paradox is woven throughout the different layers and activities involved in both terror campaigns and fighting terror campaigns
So, to Lisa's question--how does this “The terrorist is, at a very basic level, an unconventional warrior. For the unconventional warrior, security is simply a planning consideration.” mesh with your statement ." That terrorists are inept?

Being unconventional is not synonymous with being competent. Throughout the manuscript I have attempted to point out or delineate between tactical and strategic---in a competant and viable plan, tactics support operations and operations fulfill strategy---so a dumb example--when West Marine (tm) institutes the tactical policy of taking anything in return--they know individual stores are going to lose cash on fraudulent returns----but that loss supports the strategy of being the friendliest easiest to deal with marine store in the country---that is good thinking. SO in the question you pose, you are comparing a comment I made about tactical operations and a comment about operational/strategic acumen--different things. When special operators or unconventional warriors are given a mission, it is there job to accomplish the mission---NOT point out all the ways the mission can not be accomplished. So the specific point was--when I am presented with security, I just have to plan around or through it--not be deterred by it---the Maginot Line was a great deterrent right until Hitler decided to go around it. But the problem that organizations like Al Qaeda have is that they have been unable to build an organization that can actual sustain those tactical operations---that is where they are inept. And--to a point that hinders and transfers into their tactical operations

The United States is simply too big, too robust and too good at making money during tragic circumstances to be vulnerable to a threat like terrorism" I want to ask Tom, if you see that statement as valid in terms of Al Qaeda and other terror groups only? Or if that includes terror attacks by a nation-state also? For some reason Iran comes to mind. Or does that change the whole ball game and we call that war not terror attacks ?
Well unfortunately we like to call just about any act of violence a terror attack--unless we are the instigators of the violence. If the actions are carried out and acknowledged by a nation state the problem becomes easier--- our Nations military and political structure is designed to fight other nation states ( or enter in trade etc). However, the premise still stands. Compare the experience of driving in one direction for twelve hours in the United States and in Europe---in Europ you cross several borders--in the US---you get across Kansas---the point being that the shear size and robustness skews the vulnerability.

For The Courage

I have decided to post a manuscript which I completed in 2003. It is titled "For The Courage of The Founders" and intends to be a discussion on the strategic shortfalls of the then (2003) current Global War On Terror (GWOT). I was unable to get it published, with the reasons running from "too controversial" to "too confrontational". However, in the past four years, it seems that two things have begun to occur--people are beginning to see the true cost of poor strategy and items in the manuscript are actually happening. So, I thought I might as well at least get it out into the media in some fashion.

A bit about the inspiration. I had just returned from commanding combat troops in Afghanistan and had thought I was pretty slick. I then visited the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia. The opening 16 minute multi-media presentation left me in tears. Those were people with Courage and Vision. I left the NCC with a much better understanding, I felt, of what it really took to create the United States.

Since I began working in Combating Terrorism at the Policy Level, I had felt that we were 1) Missing the point and 2) Failing to develop a strategy that put terrorism in proper context. My visit to the NCC allowed those misgivings and seven years of work in the field to coalesce into what would become "For The Courage of The Founders". It is not about personal safety, wealth or glory. It is not about persuading everyone you are right. It is about creating strategic parameters that will ensure not "what" will happen, but rather "how" things will happen--so that a country of law will have an opportunity to prosper.

Read For The Courage of The Founders online.